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THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGELi
BY EDWARD

THE

disturbing events

and tragedies of recent history have

forced upon the attention of
the social order in which

SCHAUB

L.

we

all

thoughtful

are living.

men

They have

the nature of

led to a deeply

and into the
and value of our present civilization. This has
widened the interest in philosophy. For, some truth there surely
is in Hegel's remark that a philosophy is the mode in which an
epoch exhibits a reflective self-consciousness of its diversified and
serious investigation into the fundamental principles

real

significance

yet basically related expressions.

ing impetus

from the

Philosophy, moreover,

is

fact that individuals are being turned

receiv-

by the

forces of circumstance into the search for a satisfactory Lebens-

anschauung.

Scientists,

on their

restricted fields to determine the

and

to discover a synthesis in

part,

are pressing beyond their

wider bearings of their theories

which ascertained truths may dwell

together in a meaningful coherence.
richly adorned temple of the sciences

It

is

keenly realized that the

—to employ a figure of Hegel's

IThis paper was prepared in response to the desire of the Editor to
the centenary of the death of one of mankind's

take some cognizance of
master minds.

George William Frederick Hegel died in Berlin, on November 14, 1831,
while at the height of his academic influence and of his philosophic powers.
He was then sixty-one years of age, having been born on August 27, 1770.
His native city was Stuttgart, and the influence of this Swabian environment, as well as of the upper middle class family to which he belonged, manifested themselves in his attitudes and thought throughout his entire career.
From the elementary schools and the gymnasium of Stuttgart, Hegel
went, in 1788, to the university in Tubingen. Here he was matriculated as
a student of theology. He gave large play, however, to an early acquired interest in Greek literature and ar't, and he turned his attention also to current revolutionary movements and to contemporary writers, particularly Rousseau, as well as to Kant's teachings concerning the moral autonomy of the
He devoted much thought likewise to the relation of
rational individual.
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—must

again be given

Thus we
from the

holy of holies, that

its

is,

a metaphysics.

are witnessing an active quest for a philosophy that issues
findings of science

the facts of concrete social
the case,

is

strange that there

at all

it

and that likewise reckons justly with
and historical experience. Such being

that particular philosophy

which

still

is

a revival of interest in

stands as man's most impos-

ing attempt to bring together into a meaningful

whole— or, more

accurately, to set forth methodically the intrinsic relationships that
subsist

between

— the

categories of logical thought, the general con-

cepts of scientific knowledge, the basal characteristics of individual minds,

and the forms and developmental stages of political and
and of those systems of re-

social institutions, of art, of religion,
flective interpretation

Whatever may be
contemporary

life

known

as philosophy?

the explanation

—whether

the conditions of

(such as those suggested), or the immanent logw

of cultural history in general or of philosophical development in
particular-

— the plain fact

is

that the philosophy of

enjoying a renaissance, even where, as
it

in the

had for decades commonly been deemed

museum

of speculative constructions.

Hegel

country of

is

today

its

birth,

to belong at best in a

•"

Kant's ethical doctrines, and of philosophy in general, to theology. All of
The
this, however, was outside the scope of his academic work in course.
is interesting to
it
certificate which he received upon leaving the university
note made special reference to his inadequate knowledge of philosophy.
During seven years of tutorship in Bern and Frankfort, Hegel centered
his personal study about the origins of Christianity and its connections with
the Greek and Jewish religions. He wrote a life of Jesus and committed to
paper his thoughts on the relations of Kant's ethical philosophy to the religion of Jesus. His mind wrestled, among other things, with the problem
of the freedom of the individual in its apparent conflict with institutional and
He clearly recognized that the principle of freedom exsocial authority.
pounded by Kant and Fichte and, in a somewhat different form, expressed b}'
yet
the revolutionary spirit of the age, had very genuine and high claims
these, he was forced to believe, must not be allowed to dim the prestige possessed by the social order in Greek life and thought. The issue was a particular form of one which, in some context or another, remained important
throughout all of Hegel's thought and writing. The whole and its parts or

—

—

;

members, the universal and the particular, unity and diversity, identity and
difference
in all of these cases, both terms, Hegel contended, must be vigor-

—

ously pressed, each in its intrinsic relations to the other, if either is to
preserve itself and to possess meaning.
In 1801 Hegel was appointed to a Privat-Docentship, and in 1805 to a
professorship, in Jena. Here he at first collaborated sympathetically with
Schelling, a friend of Tubingen days. Soon, however, he reached independent
views, critical alike of Schelling and of Fichte, whose stormy Jena career
had terminated in 1799 Critical of Schelling because of the latter's increasing
tendencies toward mysticism and his interpretation of the ultimate principle of unity as transcendent of differences
a view, Hegel pointed out, which
:

—

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL

Few

643

events in the history of philosophical systems are

more

striking than the vicissitudes of the Hegelian system, particularly

within the land where
lectual

it

was

first

firmament of Hegel's

proclaimed.

own

day,

it

The sun

in the intel-

passed abruptly, shortly

after his death, into almost total eclipse (within the orbit of Ger-

man

vision), only within

little

anew and now
German thinkers have

more than

the decade just past to

break forth

to shine with a splendor all but dazz-

ling.

of late been

moving from the most

verse starting-points in the direction of Hegelian doctrines

;

di-

Hegel's

works are again the subject of intensive study ;* a new and attemptedly definitive edition of Hegel's works is under way and
the Second International Hegelian Congress, arranged to commemorate the centenary of Hegel's death, was this past month held
in Berlin, and the majority of those on its program were Hegelians
;

from Germany.
In Italy and France the Hegelian doctrines have had a less
checkered career. They have seldom failed of able expounders or
'5

even champions.

In English-speaking countries, they have exer-

cised a leading influence ever since the time of their importation,
affords us not the light of day but leaves us in the darkness of the "night
in which all cows are black"; and critical of Fichte because of his excessively abstract conception of the Absolute Ego and his doctrine that the
"ought" is a more basic category than "being," that the "ought-to-be"
preconditions the "is."
Hegel's first great philosophic work, the Phdiwmeiwlogic des Geistes, appeared in 1807. The contents of this book are described by Edward Caird
{Hegel, p. 62) as "a kind of genetic psychology or philosophical 'Pilgrim's
Progress,' in which the individual, beginning with the lowest sensuous consciousness which is possible to a rational being, is gradually led upwards,
by the dialectic of his own thought 'to the highest speculative idea of the
world as an organic system, whose principle of unity lies in the self-conscious
intelligence."
The work, however, is so complex, as well as so unique,
that it might with equal or perhaps even greater truth be said to set forth
In the words
in dialectical form the perennial types of human experience.
"Different and
of Loewenberg {Hegc' Selections, Introduction, pp. xviii f.)
:

— sensuous

and intellectual, emotional and reflective,
and theoretical, mystic and philistine, sceptical and dogmatic,
practical
empirical and speculative, conservative and radical, selfish and social, religious
and secular are induced to voice the will to believe in their own exclusive
reasonableness. And reasonable each does appear from the point of view
(Yet each) finds its claim to power rebuked and
of its own perspective
impugned
The truth is that every particular point of view ineluctably
The dialectical method (lays) siege
suffers from a warped perspective
to every typical attitude or belief by rendering its partisan claims logicalrecurrent views of

life

—

ly ridiculous."
The battle of Jena caused a break of ten years duration in Hegel's
academic career. During this interval he served as editor of a newspaper in
Bamberg (1806-8) and as director of the gymnasium in Nuremberg (1808-16)
and, what is of vastly greater significance, he brought out his comprehensive
;
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and today they have been brought into an even more strategic position through the publication of English translations of the Plidnonueiiologie des Geistes

(by

Wisscnschaft der Logik (by
in 1929), as well as of

J.

W.

B. Baillie, in 1910) and of the
H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers,

an independent translation of a part of the

work, and through the admirable compilation of selections

latter

with which Prof. Loewenberg has enriched the Philosophy Series

Modern

of the

What

Students' Library.

modifications in the interpretation of Hegel

from the fresh study of today,

may

lations,

may

issue

especially in the light of recent trans-

not confidently be predicted.

For we

realize that after

Dilthey, in 1905, published Die Jngendgeschichte Hegels, and others
at

about the same time studied the early chapters of Hegel's

many

believed themselves in possession of a

unlock the Hegelian philosophy as a whole.

was not

a rationalist

and panlogist, but was

to

Hegel, they contended,
essentially a romantic

and, indeed, a mystic in a very real sense of this term.
lectical

life,

new key with which

His

dia-

method, they declared, was not the product of speculative

thought, nor should

it

be regarded as setting forth the movement

Wissenschaft dcr Logik, the one work, as Caird maintains, "which the modern
world has to put beside the 'Metaphysic' of Aristotle" (I.e., p. 75). Hegel's
Logik exhibits the immanent dialectical necessity with which the categories
progress from the most abstract of them all, namely "being," to the Absolute Idea, the self -comprehending Notion," the principle of rational self -consciousness.

While professor of philosophy in Heidelberg (1816-18) Hegel published
This treatise offers
the Encyclopadie dcr philosophischcn IVisscnschaften.
us the only statement which Hegel has given us of his philosophical system
as a whole. Unfortunately the material is offered, as the title page of the
book indicates, only "in Outline" it takes the form of compact paragraphs
which represent epitomizations or expressions of doctrine which Hegel developed orally in his university lectures.
From Heidelberg Hegel migrated to the university in Berlin. This institution he served for thirteen years as a professor, and, during 1830, as rector. In 1821 there appeared the GrimdUnien der Philosophic dcs Rechts, which
was thus the fourth, as it proved to be the last, of the books published by
Hegel himself. The subject matter is set forth in the manner characteristic
of the writer. Concepts are shown to lead of inner, dialectical necessity
they
to other concepts by which they are at once annulled and preserved
are shown to be partial truths, which, therefore, are not the truth while
yet they convey a truth, the nature and range of which are disclosed by the
successively more inclusive concepts. These more inclusive concepts, principles or institutions, as the case may be, are the presupposition of the more
abstract and therefore less self-sustaining ones; they are the rational matrix
of the latter, the medium within which alone these have their life and meaning. In the case of the Philosophic dcs Rechts the development is from "right,"
as abstract,, universal and external, to its antithesis "morality," which is
internal and individual, and then to the synthesis described as the ethical
;

;

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL
of reason.

It

terpretation.

645

was, on the contrary, an instrument of emotional inH'egel's logic,

hard wrestling of Hegel's

in brief, is a logic of

own

concile practical antinomies of

tragic spirit in

its

passion, of the

attempt to re-

such as those of un-

experience,

happiness and happiness, defeat and victory, profound sorrow and

Thus

exultant joy, death and the resurrection.
leged, Hegel's system as a
least clearer

and more

imagination,

its

lusion,
brilliant

its

whole becomes,

significant.

With

if

its

taken,

it

was

al-

not transparent, at

penetrating flashes of

terms freighted with a wealth of meaning and

intricately

al-

developed themes, dramatic transitions, and

denouements, Hegel's philosophy,

terance of a soaring spirit

who

it

was

said,

the ut-

is

voiced, with passionate earnestness

and philosophic artistry, his concrete reactions to the issues of human life and to the cosmos in which these have their setting. Increasing preoccupation with the Phcnovienology,
likely to fortify this

it

seems

clear,

is

On

interpretation of the Hegelian writings.

the other hand, intensified study of the later works, such as that

of the newly translated Science of Logic, will throw into

inence Hegel's insistent

demands

that emotion

promand imagination be

order and represented by the institutions of the family, the civic community,
and, finally, the state. Thus Hegel concluded that the national state is the
source and medium of abstract right and morality, and the order within which
the family and the economic and civic life reach their full possibilities
that
the national state is the culminating expression of the Absolute in the realm
of objectively manifested spirit, though, to be sure, each particular manifestation of it has its p^ace within the process of world history. For this
doctrine, with its associated defence of war, Hegel has often been subjected
to the most severe of criticisms. Whatever may be said, however, respecting
the cogency of his argument, this should not be regarded as a bid for the
favor of the political powers dominating Prussia at the time. It was rather
an honest expression of a mind which in all domains of reality sought the
essential
reasonableness of things, which had early been impressed by
Greek civilization and political philosophy, and had been a personal witness of the consequences of the revolutionary doctrines of abstract individualism. Hegel was convinced of the necessity of social stability as it is
guaranteed by a comprehensive institution an institution, however, not so
much vested with power as living in the unreserved loyalties of its members.
During his Berlin professorship Hegel's intellectual influence and prestige increased very rapidly. Not even the efforts of a Schopenhauer could
dislodge him from his position of dominance. He founded a philosophical
school which, with all its changing fortunes, has proved to be as influential
as any in modern history, and which still possesses a vitality sufficient to
destroy, through assimilation, many a movement that may rise up against it.
Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy and on the philosophy of
history, of art, and of religion, were published posthumously from student
notes, and they now form part of the edition of Hegel's works brought out
in 1832-5 in the form of eighteen volumes, later supplemented by a volume
of letters edited by Hegel's son, Karl.
;

—
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kept in proper bounds by the

critical reason, that reflective

thought

and that insight and knowledge
be claimed only where conclusions are rationally comprehended,
that is, are understood not alone in terms of the principles and

be given

its

rightful sovereignty,

processes employed in reaching them, but also in the light of their

underlying assumptions

when

these

are

themselves grasped and

definitely justified.

In his introductory preface to the Science of Logic Viscount

Haldane ventures the assertion that "no student of philosophy can
be sure of the ground he is treading unless he has made the effort
required to follow out what Hegel claims to tell him." Hegel's
philosophy an indispensable object of study for all who would
philosophize seriously even today!

What

thing greater, one might

Yet one claim
there is which, if not greater, is at least more sweeping, and it is
this which Hegel did not hesitate himself to advance for the philosophy which he developed. The latter, he insisted, is the absolute

well ask, could be claimed for any system of thought

philosophy.

It

sets

?

forth the final truth; moreover,

it

does so in

such wise as cogently to exhibit the fact that what it presents is
in fact the truth. Hence it merits not merely the study but also
the acceptance of

all

who would

possess a valid comprehension of

reality.

This claim, extravagant or even preposterous as to some it may
appear, was not the expression of a frenzied, a Nietzschean, or
2This subject is penetratingly analyzed by Dr. Heinrich Levy in his
monograph Die Hegel-Renaissance in der deiitschcn Philosophie, pp. 5ff.
For an illuminating account of the conditions that have led to a renewed interest in metaphysics, more especially on the part of German philosophers,
reference may be made to the essay on "Contemporary Metaphysics" which
Professor Arthur Liebert contributed to the present writer's volume,
losophy Today (Open Court Publishing Co., 1928).
3 During a visit which the writer was privileged
with the late Alois Riehl, this distinguished scholar but
inquired how it could be that the Hegelian philosophy,
in Germany as essentially misdirected and false, should
such high and wide-spread recognition among British and

—

may
this

Phi-

to have in Berlin
twenty years ago
so long discarded

continue to receive

American

thinkers.

4As one item in the rapidly growing bibliography, particular reference
be made to Th. L. Haering's Hegel: Sein IVollen und sein IVerk. Of
work only the first volume (1929) has as yet appeared. This is a tome

of 785 pages, though the period covered is only that prior to
therefore to the time when Hegel's system first took form.

1802,

prior,

5For a glance at the rich and varied program of this Congress, see The
Monist. XLI, 4, (October, 1931), p. 636.
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Hegel could logically put forth no other. For
from his conception of reality and from his

a bigoted mood.

the claim followed

doctrine concerning the nature and office of philosophy.

And

these

views, he believed himself to have shown, have their foundation in
the

immanent and

centuries, of

logically necessary development,
reflective

self-critical,

throughout the

thought concerning the world

and man's place therein, and concerning the principles and standpoints involved in such reflection.

Let us develop this point a

system explored,

bit further.

Hegel's comprehensive

the field of logical categories and, secondly,

first,

domain of physical nature then it passed on to the realm
in which nature comes to a consciousness of itself in man, and in
which the meanings and self-conscious purposes of the individual
mind are objectified (and thus in course expanded and rationalized)
into and through social institutions and art, which are superseded
the

;

by the direct realization,

in religious experience, of

man's identity

which is absolute spirit, and finally
the efl^ort at a rational comprehension (called philosophy) of
truth vouchsafed by the religious experience l:)Ut embodied by
latter in imaginative forms.
This philosophic comprehension,
with the ultimate

self-conscious rationality, reaches

order which
genesis

it

knows

and of

its

;

when

of the validity of

comes

to a rational

philosophy

;

and,

it

its

findings,

and of the
reality

it-

its

own

comprehension of

furthermore, the

the truth of the latter

identity of itself

attains

to

cul-

its

in the capacity of self-conscious beings,
itself,

and

culmination of

this

it

does in

philosophy

is

which the nature and
are methodically and rationally set forth, and

that philosophical knowledge of philosophy

in

as

understands

it

possesses a knowledge of

Thus, for Hegel,

minating expression when,

in

when

the

development into the clear consciousness of

with the real world.

it

goal

its

the

grasping the truth and also as integrally related to the real

self as

itself,

by

reality,

in

which philosophy has therefore reached its goal. The philosophy
which the logical development of philosophy thus issues is final.

Its finality is

guaranteed by the fact that the principles underlying

other philosophies give way, under active reflection and by an im-

manent

rational necessity, to successively ampler

ples until they eventually find in
pletion.

Of

this

it

ultimate philosophy two things

explicitly recognizes

and truer

princi-

their logically required

and gives due place

may

com-

be said

:

it

to the partial truth of the
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various subordinate systems of

thought

and

;

the re-

satisfies

it

quirements of the reason which functions as the mainspring of the
succession within which they appear.

Hegel penetrated

to

the underlying principles of philosophical

systems, and with his marvellous combination of analytic power,
synoptic comprehension, and speculative gifts, set forth at once
the full range of their truth
nificant functioning.

Haldane

affirms, a

and likewise the

Because of

this fact

he

most valuable guide for

is

all

limits of their sig-

indeed, as Viscount

who would

properly

But

of their philosophical views.

assess the nature and validity

Hegel himself, as we have noted, believed himself

to

have shown

conclusively that the dialectic of philosophic thought leads inevit-

ably

and

to,

finds

logical

This system he therefore

completion

felt

one particular system.

in,

Hence

under compulsion to accept.

he could make no claim for his philosophy short of absoluteness and
finality. Because this philosophy is a philosophy, and because it is
is
absolute, Hegel was forced
the final truth of reality.
embodied
by
already
have suggested, is for
foregoing
will
Reality, as the
fully
satisfies the requireHegel definable in terms of that which
ments of reason. Reason, in turn, occupies a place of centrality.

that

particular

philosophy which

his doctrines to declare that

It

it

cannot, in his view, be either an accident or a stranger within

the cosmos.

Nor can

be what recent proponents of emergent

it

characteristic

evolution

represent

reality or

some stage belonging

it:

a

of

a

particular

of

level

to the series of novelties generated

an emergent evolution. Still again,
cannot be what pragmatists and instrumentalists allege: simply
a feature or part of the equipment which, in the first instance, contributes to the survival of certain organic beings by facilitating
in the unpredictable processes of
it

their adjustments to environmental conditions, and, in

due course,

enhances the values of life by increasing the control over circumstances.

Reason, for Hegel, yields a knowledge which

is

other and

higher than that sought by certain of the modern sciences in their

concern for relations of cause and effect and for abstract laws

;

it

yields results which transcend the knowledge described by Francis

Bacon

in

terms of power. Reason,

a mere servant of
respects

its

life.

in the

Hegelian doctrine,

Quite the contrary.

ends, free as respects

its

activities,

It

is

is

autonomous

and supreme as

not
as
re-
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the manifestation in finite spirits of that

is

whose expressions include all that ex
and whose being includes within itself all its expressions. Rei
son, therefore, is the principle whereby man comes to find himself
at home in the universe and attains to the insight that this experience of at-homeness is justifiable it is a function of knowing and
universal or absolute spirit
ists

;

not of behavior, of cogition and not of action

deed

is

and

constitutive of, finite spirits,

;

it

is

central to, in-

not merely a part of

is

endowment. It is identical with the reason which underlies
What is real is raall that of which true being may be affirmed.
tional, and what is rational is real.
That reason may afford truth, and that reason satisfied represents truth attained, are the necessary assumptions on the part of
their

all

philosophies that would escape the self-contradictory position of

the absolute sceptic

who

declares

it

to be true that

we may never

Even those "critical" thinkers
powers of mind or of reason to

characterize any proposition as true.

who

set out

by investigating the
by seeking to determine the

yield truth, or

edge, must

Kant, must

—

limits of rational

knowl-

employ cognitive processes in their critiques, and so, like

—

if

they would affirm the conclusions to which

the^y

assume the validity of reason. To Hegel this seemed
saw no point in any investigation by pure
reason of itself, of its nature and powers. The latter, he contended,
are manifest in the achievements of reason when employed in its

come

tacitly

so indisputable that he

own

characteristic function of rendering intelligible the real world.

Philosophy, therefore, like pre-philosophical cognition, should begin by directing its attention to material that requires interpretation,
and should thenceforth devote itself to the task of comprehending the
nature of that which is to be known. To be sure, reason may concern itself with an examination of achieved knowledge in order
to ascertain the categories and general concepts which the latter
involves. This, however, does not reveal the structure of a mind
in the sense of

something that exists independently

were, prior to experience or the world which
it

aft'ord insight into the

world.

it

of,

and, as

it

knows. Rather does

structure of knowledge and of the real

Categories are not a priori forms of an understanding or

a reason in the sense, for example, of

by the mind upon objects

in

Kant

;

they are not imposed

such wise that the outcome

is

merely

—
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and therefore a knowledge simply of phenomena
as distinguished from an order of things-in-themselves which remains unknown and is unknowable. Categories, Hegel contends, represent the structure of the world as rationally comprehended, and
a mental product,

thus of the intelligible, and, therefore, of the real world.

much

The

cate-

have an ontological, and not simply an epistemological

gories

merely psychological

less a

—

status.

Reason, thus, of necessity begins

its

its

own

operations, however, this faith

is

increasingly justified,

validity. In the

— so

course of

—

The philosophy

tasks with a simple faith in

philosophical

the conclusion of

at

until,

Hegel teaches

thinking

its

shines forth as demonstrably valid.

it

of philosophy, Hegel believed himself to have es-

employed in knowing
the world is in principle ''dentical with the reason whose objectified
expressions are the worlds of nature and of social and historical life.
The beginning thus leads to a conclusion which represents the
presupposition of the process as a whole the end is its own begintablished, discloses the truth that the reason

;

ning.

Thus we have

mony

of the adequacy

adopted.

Such

and

a circle,

according to Hegel,

this,

of the point

a circle, for example, appears also

siders the system of the categories.

Of

these, the

when one

is

From

pure being, as the

carried on to ever

reaches one in which
in the

more
it

inclusive and concrete categories, until

identity of thought

it

its

own

self.

movement

and

object, of subject

position
itself.

and the
It,

from

of thought

The end

self-maintaining.

is

and

of

it

it

does

.

(and thus)

at

this

it

and

from

is

its

itself."

own
This

object, is the pre-

alone makes intelligible

category to the one which

is

once the fulfillment, the presup-

and

in so far also

the entire system, are therefore self-justifying;

are firmly grounded

;

reason's faith in itself and claims for

;

the real

this to explicit

mate philosophy.

.

justification of the beginning,

they are final and absolute

which brings

.

ideally distinguishes itself

supposition of being, and, furthermore,

itself

This

attains to complete satisfaction.

content as

its

content, in so far as

of

that

is

of the categories, thought

first

category of absolute idea, described by Hegel's as that whicU

"contemplates

the

con-

most simple, the

most abstract and yet most immediately inescapable,
pure being.

is testi-

view and the procedure

of

is

rational

and the philosophy

and methodical exhibition

is

the ulti-
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philosopher's concern

— with what may or

—but

•

with that which

He

is.

Wisdom, however,

wisdom.

not with that which

is

happen

will

be
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him

to

may

be or will

after death, for

example

should not aspire to prophecy but to

something that comes when ex-

is

periences have run their course and serene reflection ponders their
teachings.

It

is

not until the shadows of evening have fallen, as

owl of Minerva takes its flight. So, too,
the essential function of philosophy is not the condemnation or the
criticism of the real order under the drive of what individuals or
generations suppose ought to be. Philosophy should rather labor

Hegel reminds

us, that the

what

for a rational comprehension of
real,

To

is

also

put the matter theologically,

his preferences

aspire to
all

eirenicon

the ultimate

know

man

is

real,

and, because

our standards of value.

should not assert his ideas and

over against the rational will of God, but should

mind and should unwaveringly and

the divine

piety accept the latter as the

well as of truth.

It is

norm

in

of goodness and beauty as

therefore a degradation and a profanation of

philosophy to subsume

The course

eternally

for

of history

it

is

under the instruments of
the march of

social reform.

the absolute spirit in the

and divine. Die Wcltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht. To understand that this is the case,
and to capture the order of ideas systematically exhibited by history and nature, is the basic task of philosophy and the highest
Property, contract, family, and state, for exactivity of man.
world

;

it

no

less

than nature

is

rational

ample, are not institutions that have arisen accidentally or that
their being to the inventiveness of
justification

and meaning

subjective needs or

to be

desires.

individual men.

found

Nor

is

owe
their

in the fact that they satisfy

They express

the nature of

reality.

Their existence and their essential nature are not fortuitous but
not, however, in the sense of being causally deterare necessary

—

mined by empirical conditions but of belonging
of reason.

Some

truth there doubtless is in the

was unduly conservative

in his

social

and

to the requirements

charges that Hegel

political

theories,

that

he "deified" the state (indeed, the Prussian state), and that he was
lamentably insensitive to the injustices and other evils of existing
institutions in general.

edged that few,

if

the essential nature

On

the other hand,

any, thinkers have

and

it

should be acknowl-

more profoundly

disclosed

spiritual contributions of the basic insti-
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tutions

modern

of

civilization.

Hegel aimed rather than

own

institutions of his

And

was

it

at information

such insight that

at

concerning

how

far the

particular day, in the details of their struc-

ture and functioning, were factually true to their essential nature
and rational purpose. In his social philosophy, as throughout, Hegel
concerned himself, not with a description or an analysis of what
factually

is

but with the exhibition, in methodical form, of rational

requirements and thus of the necessary.

Hegel has

times been accused of bending his energies to

at

the spinning of imaginative cobwebs.

was scornful of

science

and

that,

It

in

has been charged that he

detachment from

facts,

he

unabashedly forced his mind to a priori speculations of the extremest

from the

and emptiest

He

truth.

the categories,

sort.

Scarcely anything could

be

further

contended, to be sure, that the point of view,

and the conclusions of the particular sciences were

not the highest, that they belonged to the level of Verstand, of the

"understanding," and not of Vernunft, of "reason."

In so doing,

from many of the greatest of thinkers, both
earlier and later, only in the subtlety and thoroughness of his analysis. He himself was well versed in the scientific knowledge of
his generation and contributed not a little to it, especially as con-

however, he

dififered

cerns the things of the

spirit.

When

the story

the genesis and development of the historical
cial disciplines

and

more, was of a deeply

work and

realistic

that savored of the subjective.

mind

finally written of

method

in

the so-

in the interpretation of philosophy, a large

ter will revolve about his

reason, of

is

teaching.

cast.

He

He

attacked

chap-

His mind, further-

repudiated everything
all

theories of a "pure"

as a spiritual substance or activity separable

from

the content of the world known, of a priori "forms" or powers
yielding

knowledge

in

independence of experience.

and reason represent the real qua
contention
and in his own procedure he ever remained faithful to
Human thought, he maintained, must surrender itself
that spirit

matter and must throughout loyally accept

its

It

was

his

intelligible,

this thesis.

to

subject

governance.

Things

must be allowed to reveal their own character comprehension is
always from within. Reason must follow der Gang der Sache selbst.
Even "independent," free lance, critiques of concepts and theories
must be eschewed. These must be permitted, yea forced, to tell
;

their

own

story

•

only

when given

full

play will their limitations,
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as well as their value, be disclosed in a genuinely significant way.

disallows every divorce between

Thus Hegel

Nd

jects.

emphatically does he decry

less

method from
is

of them.

All-pervasive

and

mind and

essential to

their

own way.

enters into our knowledge

them and thus
is

ob-

its

attempts to isolate

content. Things reveal their nature in their

This way

hend matters

all

character.

dialectical

To compre-

grasp them in their truth

dialectically, therefore, is to

not an eccentric method of forcing them into an arbitrary

is

framework.

The

method

dialectical

required method

tionally

would be

for

faithful to that to

"the truth

is

the whole."

It

is

addresses

it

others be-

the one valid and ra-

thought which,

all

which

among

not one

is

tween which philosophers may choose.

philosophy,

like

The

itself.

fact

Hence every category and general

is

that

concept,

every theory and phenomenon, every institution and manifestation
of

spirit,

to the

being instinct with the

utmost

but, in so doing

;

life

of the whole asserts itself

betrays the fact that

it

the whole and thus falls short of the truth.

which

limits

it

and

in this

wise

however, that which limits

it

so far inherent within

it

exposes

is

its

its

It

own

limitation.

To

represents a thesis which involves an antithesis

itself.

although genuinely such and therefore

own

nevertheless the latter's

not

Sincv;,

put the matter otherwise,

in

it

is

is

limitation, the limiting factor

is

thesis,

it

impinges upon that

;

this antithesis,

distinguishable
antithesis,

very nature, and therefore intrinsically related to

from the

required by
it.

its

This means

and antithesis are integral to a synthesis within
which they have determinate meanings and positions. The synThus it acthesis, however, in turn reveals its own limitations.
quires the status of a thesis with an antithesis of its own, and this
that both thesis

necessitates

a

fresh synthesis.

This condition of affairs prevails

until there finally

emerges an

rational whole,

self-sustaining

is

all-inclusive synthesis which, as the
;

which, as

infinite,

confronts

ntf

and which, as absolute, includes within itself the entire system of distinctions in the form of
subordinate syntheses with their thetic and antithetic constituents.
Some there are who extol the Hegelian method but thrust aside
what they describe as the body of Hegelian doctrine others accept the latter but find no value in the method. Neither of these
groups would Hegel consider as his disciples. Both depart from
an insistence which to him was fundamental, namely that method
extraneous limitation or antithesis

;

;

—
;
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and
tent,

mind and

Thus

own

its

objects, are inseparable.

dialectical

him an important

strict

form and con-

essential nature, that

method which Hegel advocated as prethe acquisition and the formulation of the truth seemed

the

requisite to

to

that the constituents of reahty

bound up together,

results are

are dialectical in their

discovery,

rather than an invention in the

For

sense of the term, on the part of philosophy.

this dis-

covery he gave the credit to others. The method had been used, as
he pointed out, by Socrates and Plato, and, in modern times, by
Kant and some of those who had learned from him. It is only

acknowledge, however, that no previous thinker gave to
which it received at the hands

fitting to
it

either the scope or the importance

of Hegel, nor had anyone else employed it so skillfully. On the
other hand, interpreters are to this day disagreed as to whether

the method, as found in the Hegelian philosophy, relates essentially to

concepts and

as

realities,

was above maintained, or simply

titudes and views respecting the world, or to both

;

whether

to atre-

it

mained and was intended to remain identical throughout the several
fields of its employment, such as logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind, and the transitions between them whether, as
;

Croce

contends,''^

its

use betrays a confusion between the rela-

tions of abstract aspects of a conception, on the one hand, and,

opposities

the other, of

whether

its

setting

or distinct manifestations

on

of principles

the non-temporal realm of essences or the

is

world of temporal and historical occurrences, or both whether, in
case, and when, it is utihzed for historical interpretation, culture
is regarded as continuous and cumulative or as a succession of phenomena different both in form and content and without historic
continuity and, whether, in spite of its stress upon development and
;

;

movement, and

rejection of formal

its

and of

"static" logic,"

itself, as Liebert maintains,''^ in the last analysis

staticism that

it

must give way

to a

still

newer and more

it

was

so infected with
vital dialectic

a dialectic truer to the problematical character of historical and
into English under the title IVhat is
of the Philosophy of Heqel.
"Formal logic was criticized by Hegel on the ground that its laws of
thought are tautologous and its propositions analytical, for which reason it
It belongs essentially at the level of
fails to yield significant knowledge.
mechanistic interpretation it cannot express the truth of things precisely because it is indifferent to content. To be true, thought must pulsate with the
<5In

his important

Living and

What

is

book translated

Dead

;

life

of its objects.
8In his above-mentioned essay on "Contemporary Metaphysics."
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psychological

in

life,

are combined

which (to quote Liebert)

with others

are

that

655

— "rational

elements

thoroughly irrational,

intui-

tive, and neither reducible to nor expressible in conceptual terms,"

the combination being "fundamentally antinomical and

paradoxi-

cal."

Similarly divergent also are the findings of scholars with respect
to

the

Hegel's imposing system of speculative or ab-

of

details

Upon

idealism.

solute

without making a
Suffice

posal.

ures

still

these

we may

differences

not here

here to stress some general and fundamental feat-

it

demarcate and characterize Hegel's philosophy.

that

against the Spinozistic teaching that determination

ranges the doctrine that negation

and issues

denial implies
is

a unitv that

that mediates

distinguishes
lute

is

is

Reality

in affirmation.

through and

from

in

;

it

As

spirit.

spirit

it

is

is

rational

For the absolute

possible.

determinate.

It

which

it

at

once

The infinite or absoHence it is not sub-

developmental stages and processional

its

comprehension

is

characterized by

therefore involves a

it

it

represents an identity

dift'erences

and yet sustains.

itself

Over

negation,

is

determination, that significant

realized in multiplicity

itself

knowledge of
all

is

self-determining and self-developing.

stance but

enter

heavier overdraft upon the space at our dis-

life,

and the

comprehension of

Such
borrow He-

expressions.

spirit

—

to

way of putting it— is not envious but discloses itself to the
knowing mind of man^ it does not remain hidden but wills to be
known and does reveal its inmost nature to human reason. Reality,
gel's

;

to be sure,
detail

;

is

not,

and

yet in principle

never be,

will

is

it

known

knowable.

in the

fullness of

its

Metaphysical agnosticism

The declaration that reality is
unknowable can be based only on some knowledge of reality. To
know a limit is already to have transcended it. Similarly, opposi-

may seem modest

tions

and

yet

it

is

false.

antitheses, in so far as they appear as such to thought,

are Vpso fticto already in principle overcome and require only an
explicit integration into syntheses.

The Kantian

doctrine of things-

in-themselves therefore succumbs to attacks from this line of ap-

proach as well as from a true apprehension of the nature and

sta-

tus of the categories.
9 "To say that

we cannot grasp

we cannot

penetrate into the essence of nature, to say that
God, is to believe that he is envious. God

the nature of

communicates and reveals what he is" (JVerke, VI, pp. 277 f.) Also: "The
on the veil of Isis vanishes before thought" (Ibid., VII, p. 16).
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THE OPEN COURT

The debate over the vahdity of Hegel's general point of view
and central teachings is not likely soon to terminate. But even
among the doubters and deniers there are many who find in Hegel's
detailed treatments of philosophical principles and systems, of politics, of art, and of religion many insights and interpretations which
impress them as penetrating and fruitful. Hegel's style, as well as his
thought, imposes a heavy burden upon the reader. Yet scattered
throughout his writing are epigrammatic statements of unusual power,
and metaphors which, as "living flowers of imagination," brighten
the difficult path which a student of Hegel must tread. That the
path yields ample rewards for him who has the strength and the
resolution to persist thereon

is

today more widely acknowledged,

perhaps, than at any time since Hegel's death a hundred years ago.

